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PROBLEMS IN THE APPLICATION OF FULL FAITH
AND CREDIT FOR INDIAN TRIBES
FRED L. RAGSDALE, JR.*

INTRODUCTION: JIM v. CIT FINANCIAL SERVICE CORP.

Recently, the New Mexico Supreme Court, in Jim v. CIT Financial
Services Corp.,' held that the Navajo Nation was a territory for the
purposes of 28 U.S.C. 1738 (1970)2 which is the enabling statute for
3
the Full Faith & Credit Clause of the United States Constitution.
Although the court's holding dealt with a choice of law problem
involving Navajo Tribal law4 and New Mexico commercial law,' the
court's decision has important implications for the problem of recognition of judgments between states and Indian tribes.
In Jim, the petitioner, Allan Jim, an enrolled member of the
Navajo Nation, purchased a pickup truck in Farmington, New Mexico. Respondent, CIT Financial Services Corp., financed the purchase
of the truck. Petitioner, living on the reservation and keeping his
truck there, failed to make the payments on the truck as they came
due. Respondent, without taking any action in the Navajo Tribal
Court, sent two agents onto the Navajo Reservation and had them
repossess the truck.
Petitioner then filed an action in New Mexico District Court for
*Assistant Professor, UNM School of Law. Prof. Ragsdale is a member of the Chemehuevi
tribe.
1. 87 N.M. 362, 553 P.2d 751 (1975).
2. The text of the statute is as follows:
[T] he Acts of the legislature of any State, Territory, or Possession of the United
States, or copies thereof shall be authenticated by affixing the seal of such State,
Territory, or Possession thereto.
The records and judicial proceedings of any court of any such State, Territory or Possession, or copies thereof, shall be proved or admitted in other
courts within the United States and its Territories and Possessions by the
attestation of the clerk and seal of the court annexed, if a seal exists, together
with a certificate of a judge of the Court that the said attestation is in proper
form.
Such Acts, records and judicial proceedings or copies thereof, so authenticated, shall have the same full faith and credit in every court within the
United States and its Territories and Possessions as they have by law or usage
in the courts of such State, Territory or Possession from which they are taken.
3. U.S. Const. art. IV, § 1.
4. 7 Navajo Tribal Code § § 307, 309 (1969).
5. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 50A-9-503 (Repl. 1962).
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damages based on sections 3076 and 3097 of the Navajo Tribal Code.
The provisions required either written consent from the party
affected or a tribal court order before personal property of Navajo
Indians could be repossessed. These sections, by allowing recovery of
a percentage of the purchase price, also provided a remedy to the
party affected by the wrongful repossession.
The district court dismissed the action, apparently finding that the
New Mexico law authorizing self-help repossession applied to the
action and not the provisions of the Navajo Tribal Code.8 On appeal,
a 2-1 majority of the court of appeals affirmed the dismissal of the
district court. 9 The New Mexico Supreme Court reversed the court
of appeals by holding that 28 U.S.C. 1738 (1970) was applicable and
that the Navajo Nation was a territory for purposes of full faith and
credit." 0 On remand, the district court, by looking at the terms of
the contract between the parties, was to determine which law should
apply.
The New Mexico Supreme Court's decision, one rendered in a state
with numerous Indian reservations, is particularly important because
it recognizes tribal law as a legitimate alternative in choice of law
situations and because it institutionalizes the relationship between
state and tribe. And even though Jim addresses only the issue of
choice of law, it is equally important in the area of recognition of
6. 7 Navajo Tribal Code § 307 (1969) states:
Repossession of personal property.
The personal property of Navajo Indians shall not be taken from land subject
to the jurisdiction of the Navajo Tribe under the procedures of repossession
except in strict compliance with the following:
(a) Written consent to remove the property from land subject to the jurisdiction of the Navajo Tribe shall be secured from the purchaser as the time
repossession is sought. The written consent shall be retained by the creditor
and exhibited to the Navajo Tribe upon proper demand.
(b) Where the Navajo refuses to sign said written consent to permit removal
of the property from land subject to the jurisdiction of the Navajo Tribe the
property shall be removed only by order of a Tribal Court of the Navajo Tribe
in an appropriate legal proceeding.
7. 7 Navajo Tribal Code § 309 (1969) states in part:
Civil Liability. Any person who violates section 307 of this title and any
business whose employee violates such section is deemed to have breached the
peace of the lands under the jurisdiction of the Navajo Tribe, and shall be
civilly liable to the purchaser for any loss caused by the failure to comply with
sections 307-09 of this title.
If the personal property repossessed is consumer goods (to wit: goods used
or bought for use primarily for personal, family or household purposes), the
purchaser has the right to recover in any event an amount not less than the
credit service charge plus ten percent (10%) of the principal amount of the
debt or the time price differential plus ten percent (10%) of the cash price.
8. 7 Navajo Tribal Code § § 307, 309 (1969).
9. 86 N.M. 784, 527 P.2d 1222 (Ct. App. 1974).
10. 87 N.M. 362, 363, 533 P.2d 751, 752 (1975).
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judgments because of its interpretation of the Navajo Nation as a
territory for purposes of 28 U.S.C. 1738 (1970). If the New Mexico
Supreme Court is correct in its finding that the Navajo Nation, like
all other Indian tribes, is a territory for purposes of 28 U.S.C. 1738
(1970), then suddenly Indian tribes are constitutionally compelled to
recognize state court judgments. The case law' 1 prior to Jim indicated that Indian tribes were not affected by the Full Faith and
Credit Clause and its enabling legislation.
This article will discuss the history of the Full Faith and Credit
Clause and its enabling legislation, the case law dealing with full faith
and credit for Indian tribes, the policy reasons supporting extension
of full faith and credit to Indian tribes, and the problems that could
arise were full faith and credit statutorily extended to Indian tribes.
HISTORY OF FULL FAITH AND CREDIT CLAUSE AND ITS
EXTENSION TO INDIAN TRIBES
The general history of the Full Faith and Credit Clause, its
enabling legislation, and the case law interpreting its application to
Indian tribes illustrate the ambiguity of constitutionally requiring
extension of full faith and credit to Indian tribes. The history of the
Full Faith and Credit Clause and its enabling legislation indicate that
Indian tribes were not consciously included in the full faith and
credit schemata. Neither the Clause itself nor the enabling legislation
expressly provides for the extension of full faith and credit to Indian
tribes. The case law defining "territory" is not helpful either. One
can only conclude that sometimes an Indian tribe is considered a
territory and sometimes it is not. Likewise, the case law defining the
extension of full faith and credit to Indian tribes is ambiguous. As a
result there is no adequate legal theory sufficient to compel extension of full faith and credit to Indian tribes.
The History of the Full Faith and Credit and Its
EnablingLegislation
The Full Faith and Credit Clause was incorporated by the framers
of the Constitution out of a vaguely articulated need to control relationships between the states.' 2 Full faith and credit was a substitute
for the older notion of comity. Under the concept of comity, foreign
11. See Annis v. Dewey County Bank, 335 F. Supp. 133 (D.S.D. 1971), In re Lynch's
Estate, 92 Ariz. 354, 377 P.2d 199 (1962) and Begay v. Miller, 70 Ariz. 380, 222 P.2d 624
(1950).
12. See generally, Nadelmann, Full Faith and Credit to Judgments and Public Acts: A
HistoricalAnalytical Reappraisal, 56 Mich. L. Rev. 33, 53-59 (1957) and A. McLaughlin, A
Constitutional History of the United States 127 (1936).
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states were not compelled to recognize either foreign laws or foreign
state judgments. Under the Full Faith and Credit Clause application
of foreign laws and recognition of foreign state judgments, in theory
at least, become constitutionally compelled.
The history of the Clause, however, makes no mention of either
territories or Indian tribes.1 3 Since the Constitution mentions Indian
tribes elsewhere' 4 one might conclude that the drafters consciously
excluded tribes from the scheme of full faith and credit. In any case
the history of the Clause, because there is no express mention of
Indian tribes in either the Clause itself or its history, offers no
convincing evidence that it was meant to extend to Indian tribes.
The history of the enabling legislation is similarly silent on the
inclusion of Indian tribes into the full faith and credit framework. In
1790 Congress passed an act' I to prescribe the procedure for recognition of foreign state judgments. Commentators on the history of
the enabling legislation have referred to subsequent changes prior to
1948 as technical only. 1 6 One of those technical changes raises the
issue of the meaning and scope of the word "territory."' '
In 1804 Congress amended'" the 1790 Act.'" The 1804 Act
prescribed the manner of proof necessary, described the effect of
records on various courts, and extended the scope of the enabling
legislation to the territories. The extension of the Full Faith and
Credit Clause to the territories was necessary for accomplishing
integration of the newly conquered lands of the west into the federal
system. Unfortunately, however, the legislative history on the territorial amendment does not mention Indian tribes. 2 . Subsequent
changes in the statute have been technical only. 2 ' The legislative
history of these changes nowhere mentions Indian tribes.
Case Law Defining "Territory"
The only interpretation of the meaning of "territory" for the
purposes of the 1804 statute 22 and its successors 2 3 involves the
13. See Nadelmann, supra note 11, at 53-59.
14. U.S. Const. art. 1, § 8, cl.3.
15. Act of May 26, 1790, ch. 11, 1 Stat. 122.
16. Nadelmann, supra note 12, at 81-82 and A. Von Mehren & D. Trautman, The Law of
Multistate Problems 1228 (1965).
17. See Act of March 27, 1804, ch. 56, 2 Stat. 298.
18. Id.
19. Act of May 26, 1790, ch. 11, 1 Stat. 122.
20. See Nadelmann, supra note 12, at 61-62.
21. Nadelmann, supra note 12, at 81-82 and A. Von Mehren & D. Trautman, supra note
16, at 1228.
22. Act of March 27, 1804, ch. 56, 2 Stat. 298.
23. See 28 U.S.C. § 687 (1940) and 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (1970).
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2
status of the District of Columbia. 2 ' In Embry v. Palmer s the
Supreme Court addressed the issue of whether the District of
Columbia was a territory for the purposes of the 1804 statute and
found that it was a territory. But before reaching this issue, the
Court addressed whether Congress had the power to extend the
operation of the Full Faith and Credit Clause to territories since the
Clause made only express mention of full faith and credit between
states. The Court found that the general judicial powers embodied in
Article 1112 6 were broad enough to empower Congress to legislate
beyond interstate relationships. Embry is important for two reasons.
First, it could serve as a precedent authorizing congressional legislation extending the operation of the Full Faith and Credit Clause
between tribe and state. Second, Embry clearly illustrates that
"territory" is not a fixed concept and that one must interpret the
meaning of "territory" in the light of the context.
In District of Columbia v. Carter,2 ' a case involving a question
similar to Embry, the Supreme Court determined that the District of
Columbia was not a territory for purposes of 42 U.S.C. 1983 (1970),
the statute authorizing civil actions against any state or territory for
deprivation of rights guaranteed by the Constitution and laws of the
United States. Although Embry and Carter might seem contradictory
at first, when read together they demonstrate that determining the
territorial status of a political entity depends on the purpose and
intent of the statute.
Another analogue to 28 U.S.C. 1738 (1970) is the legislation
implementing interstate extradition.' 8 In Arizona ex rel. Merrill v.
Turtle,2" the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held that Arizona had
no power to extradite an Indian from the Navajo Reservation
pursuant to constitutional extradition demands made by Oklahoma.
The court based its reasoning on provisions found in the Navajo
Treaty of 1868 and on the general principal of Indian law that those
rights not specifically taken from the tribe still remain with the

24. Although it is true that in Mackey v. Coxe, 59 U.S. (18 How.) 100 (1855), the
Supreme Court found that the Cherokee Nation was a Territory for purposes of the enabling
legislation requiring recognition of administrators appointed from the Territories (see Act of
June 29, 1812, ch. 106, 11, 2 Stat. 758), the Court did not specifically mention the Full
Faith and Credit Clause or other enabling legislation.
25. 107 U.S. 3 (1882).
26. U.S. Const. art. Ill.
27. 409 U.S. 418 (1972).
28. This statute is the enabling legislation for a constitutional provision, U.S. Const. art.
IV, § 2, cl. 2.
29. 413 F.2d 683 (9th Cir. 1969).
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tribe.3" In so doing, the court effectively excluded the Navajo Tribe
from status as a territory for purposes of the extradition statute. 3 1
The case law defining territory as it might relate to Indian tribes
and the full faith and credit enabling legislation supplies no ready
answer. The case law indicates that the classification of a political
entity as a territory depends largely on the purpose and intent of the
statute in question. And in Turtle the status of the Navajo tribe
depended on such external considerations as terms of a treaty and
general principles of Indian law.
Case Law Defining Full Faith and Creditfor Indian Tribes
The leading case holding that public records from tribal courts are
entitled to a limited form of full faith and credit is Mackey v.
Coxe.3 2 Although Mackey involved the provision of the enabling
legislation of 1812"
requiring recognition of administrators
appointed from the territories and not the Acts of 1790 or 1804, 34
the Supreme Court held that Cherokee Nation's letters of appointment for testamentary purposes were entitled to full faith and credit.
The Court found that, at least for the purposes of the 1812 Act,
Indian nations were territories. The Court reasoned that:
In some respects they (tribes) bear the same relation to the federal
government as a territory did in its second grade of government,
under the Ordinance of 1787. Such territory passed its own laws,
subject to the approval of Congress. The principal difference consists
in the fact that the Cherokees enact their own laws, under the
restriction stated, appoint their own officers, and pay their own
expenses. This, however, is no reason why the laws and proceedings
of the Cherokee territory, so far as relates to rights claimed under
them, should not be placed upon the same footing as other territories in the Union. It is not a foreign, but a domestic territory-a
territory which originated under our constitution and laws. 35
It is interesting to note, however, that the Court does not expressly
discuss the application of the Full Faith and Credit Clause or its
other enabling legislation to Indian tribes.
The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals, in the late nineteenth cen30. See Treaty of June 1, 1968, 15 Stat. 667 and Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.)
515 (1832).

31. 18 U.S.C. § 3182 (1970).
32.
33.
34.
298.
35.

59 U.S. (18 How.) 100 (1855).
Act of June 29, 1812, ch. 106, 11, 2 Stat. 758.
Act of May 26, 1790, ch. 11, 1 Stat. 122 and Act of March 27, 1804, ch. 56, 2 Stat.
59 U.S. (10 How.) 100, 103 (1855).
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tury,3 6 adopted the same position in a number of cases involving
39
ejectment, 3 7 wrongful detainer, 3 8 the dismissal of an injunction,
4
41
4
use tax, 2 and probate proquarantine regulation, 0 divorce,
ceedings.4 3 The importance of these cases is that they extend full
faith and credit to the proceedings of tribal courts just as if they
were proceedings of territorial courts. None of these cases, with the
exception of Mackey, discusses any relevant full faith and credit
legislation. Consequently, the relationship between the cases and full
faith and credit legislation, particularly 28 U.S.C. 1738 (1970), is
tenuous at best.
In contrast to these cases supporting the proposition that tribes
44
an Arizona
are entitled to full faith and credit is Begay v. Miller,
Supreme Court case. In addressing the validity of a divorce decree
entered by a Navajo Tribal Court to two members of the Navajo
tribe, the court, although rejecting recognition based on the Full
4
Faith and Credit Clause or on the principles of comity, I found that
the tribal divorce must be recognized "because of the general rule,
call it by whatever name you will, that a divorce valid by the law
'46
The court ignored both
where it was granted is valid anywhere."
28 U.S.C. 1738 (1970) and the line of cases holding that tribes are
entitled to full faith and credit.
Since then Arizona has partially retreated from the holding in
4
the Arizona Supreme Court held
Begay. In In re Lynch's Estate,
that a Navajo will, already having been admitted to probate in a
tribal court, should be given the same force and effect as a will
originally probated in an Arizona state court. The court found that
"the proceedings held in the Navajo Tribal Court must be treated the
same as proceedings in a court of another state or foreign coun36. The creation of the 10th Circuit in 1929 made most of these cases 10th Circuit
precedents rather than 8th Circuit ones, since the cases arose in states presently within the
10th Circuit jurisdiction. See Act of Feb. 28, 1929, ch. 363, 116, 45 Stat. 1346.
37. Mehlin v. Ice, 56 F. 12 (8th Cir. 1893).
38. Exendine v. Pore, 56 F. 777 (8th Cir. 1893).
39. Standley v. Roberts, 59 F. 836 (8th Cir. 1894), appeal dismissed, 166 U.S. 1177
(1896).
40. Cornells v. Shannon, 63 F. 305 (8th Cir. 1894).
41. Raymond v. Raymond, 83 F. 721 (8th Cir. 1897).
42. Buster v. Wright, 135 F. 947 (8th Cir. 1905).
43. Hayes v. Barringer, 168 F. 221 (8th Cir. 1909).
44. 70 Ariz. 380, 222 P.2d 624 (1950).
45. Id. at 384, 222 P.2d at 628. Since a court can recognize other courts' judgments only
through comity or full faith and credit, it is difficult to understand exactly what the court
thought it was doing in recognizing the divorce while explicitly denying both comity and
full faith and credit.
46. Id.
47. 92 Ariz. 354, 377 P.2d 199 (1962).
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'4 8

try.
Arizona is backpedaling from its position in Begay to a
4
position of at least comity. 9
Both the Arizona cases and the federal line of cases on extending
full faith and credit to Indian tribes offer no convincing answer to
the question of whether such extension of the clause is constitutionally mandated. Furthermore, since neither line of cases specifically address the relevant full faith and credit enabling legislation,' 0 it might be helpful to look at the statute itself' ' in order to
determine if statutory interpretation in any way clarifies the problem.
Concerning this approach the 1884 Supreme Court case of Elk v.
Wilkins' I is instructive. The Court found that, because the citizenship clause of the 14th amendment' ' did not expressly mention
Indians or Indian tribes, petitioner John Elk, an Indian, was not a
citizen under the 14th amendment and therefore not entitled to vote
as a citizen under the 15th amendment.5 4 In finding that the 14th
amendment citizenship clause did not apply to Indians, the
Court followed the general principle that general acts of Congress do
not apply to Indians unless so expressed as to manifest a clear inten5
tion to include them. 5
By this reasoning 28 U.S.C. 1738 (1970) would not be applicable
to Indians because they are not expressly covered by the statute. In
Navajo Tribe v. National Labor Relations Board"6 the District of
Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals held that the National Labor
Relations Board had jurisdiction over a labor dispute on the Navajo
Reservation. The court specifically stated that the congressionally
announced policies of the National Labor Relations Board superceded the local policies of states and Indian tribes, even though the
relevant legislation did not address the issues of jurisdiction on
Indian Reservations. In so holding the court directly addressed the
concept of exemption for Indians from general legislation.
The decision of Elk v. Wilkins, 112 U.S. 94 (1884), whatever its
48. Id. at 357, 377 P.2d at 201.
49. The Court's recognition of comity was based on Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217
(1959).
50. Note that Mackey v. Coxe, 59 U.S. (18 How.) 100 (1855) dealt only with the 1812
statute (see Act of June 29, 1812, ch. 106, 11, 2 Stat. 758), which dealt only with the
recognition of administrators appointed from the territories; it did not address the problems
of choice of law or recognition of judgments.
51. 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (1970).
52. 112 U.S. 94 (1884).
53. U.S. Const. amend. XV.
54. U.S. Const. amend. XIV.
55. 112 U.S. 94, 100 (1884).
56. 288 F.2d 162 (D.C. Cir. 1961).
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present-day significance, certainly does not operate to remove
"Indians and their property interests" from the coverage of a generMl
statute .... The National Labor Relations Act is a general statute. Its
jurisdictional

provisions, and its definitions of "employer,"

"employee," and "commerce" are of broad and comprehensive
scope.17

This same reasoning would seem to apply to 28 U.S.C. 1738
(1970), thus making it mandatory for tribes to adhere to 28 U.S.C.
1738 (1970) and to afford other states and territories full faith and
credit. The statute is one of general application and seeks to promote
judicial economy and to improve intergovernmental relations.5 8
Using the Navajo Tribe case, it would appear that inclusion of tribes
might be permissible, at least through statutory construction.
Interestingly enough, however, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
came to a differerit conclusion when considering the Navajo Tribe as
a territory for purposes of the extradition statute.5 In Arizona ex
rel. Merrill v. Turtle,6 o discussed earlier, the court held that Arizona
had no power to extradite an Indian from the Navajo Reservation
pursuant to the extradition demand of Oklahoma. Under Turtle, one
might argue by analogy that full faith and credit, like the extradition
clause and its enabling legislation, will not apply to tribes unless
extended by an act of Congress.
Generally, then, the legal arguments available for urging the extension of full faith and credit to Indian tribes are inadequate. Neither
the Full Faith and Credit Clause nor its enabling legislation expressly
provides for the extension of the Clause to Indian tribes. Furthermore, the history of the Clause and its enabling legislation also
indicates that Indian tribes were not consciously included in the full
faith and credit framework. The case law defining territory is not
helpful either. Likewise, the case law on extending full faith and
credit to Indian tribes is ambiguous. Consequently, because no legal
theory is sufficiently convincing, only policy grounds remain for
arguing that full faith and credit should be extended to Indian tribes.
REASONS FOR EXTENDING FULL FAITH AND CREDIT TO
INDIAN TRIBES

The present relationship between states and Indian reservations is
not unlike that which existed between the states in the Confederation in 1778. The mutual interests of both the states and tribes are
57. Id. at 165, footnote 4.
58. A. Von Mehren & D. Trautman, The Law of Multistate Problems 1228-30 (1965).

59. 18 U.S.C. § 3182 (1970).
60. 413 F.2d 683 (9th Cir. 1969).
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better served when the processes of resolving conflicts aie institutionalized. A change in any factor may affect the application of the
jurisdiction's law. This confusing jurisdictional morass often turns
relatively simple problems between states into complex cases when
6
they involve an Indian tribe and a state. 1
With the Supreme Court's unanimous decision in McClanahan v.
Arizona State Tax Commission,6 2 which held that Arizona was without power to impose or collect taxes against an Indian living on the
reservation whose income was earned from reservation sources, it is
apparent the problems of defining relationships resulting from overlapping degrees of self-government of the state and the tribe will
continue. Such problems will continue because McClanahan supports
at a minimum the continuance of limited tribal self-government.
The inclusion of tribes into full faith and credit procedures is one
method of alleviating some of the tension that exists between tribes
and states. A large part of the tension results from barriers that
jurisdiction creates to impede the normal relationship between
citizens of each political entity. Full faith and credit, if mutually
afforded between those entities, should alleviate some problems if
only on a personal level. Tribes presently are exercising more of their
residual powers; these powers are very similar to the general powers
of a state or municipality and are not dependent on race. This extension of tribal power and its acceptance by the judicial, legislative, and
executive branches of government mark an historic change in the
position of Indian tribes in America. This would constitute an
official recognition of tribal autonomy and its political permanence.
Almost without exception, past policy of the United States towards
Indians viewed them as a transient phenomenon. Indians were
considered a temporary problem that eventually would solve itself
with the Indians being absorbed into the melting pot of America.
The major policy issue in America as to Indians has been aptly
characterized as a dispute as to whether to civilize and then Chris6
This
tianize them or to Christianize first and then civilize them.
last
The
view of the Indian problem has become less important.
not
are
tribes
decade has made it apparent that Indians and Indian
going to disappear.
Because Indian tribes are here to stay, it is necessary to begin to
integrate tribal governments into the permanent fabric of America.
61. For an enlightening discussion of the complexities of civil jurisdiction on Indian
reservations, see Canby, Civil Jurisdiction and the Indian Reservation, 1973 Utah L. Rev.
206.
62. 411 U.S. 164 (1973).
63. A. Berkhofer, Salvation and the Savage 5 (1972).
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Extending full faith and credit to Indian tribes is a starting point for
institutionalizing this process. Each entity retains a degree of selfgovernment protected from encroachment from the others. But
because of the unique status of states and tribes that has evolved, the
nature of intercourse between citizens of states and tribal members is
more volatile than that existing between citizens of different states.
Reservations are physically within the geographic boundaries of
states. Tribal members are citizens of the United States and the state
in which they live. They are entitled to all the privileges and immunities of a United States citizen. 6 4 But, they also are entitled to
certain additional privileges and protections. For example, their
properties on the reservation are exempt from state taxes,6
and
66
income earned on the reservation is exempt from state income tax
and state sales tax. 6 7 The reservation itself is also immune from
68
building codes, 69
certain state regulation such as zoning laws,
eminent domain, 7" and most importantly, from exercise of certain
criminal and civil jurisdiction. 7
The need to institutionalize the relationship between state and
tribe can best be understood in the context of two cases: Annis v.
Dewey County Bank,7 2 and State Securities, Inc. v. Anderson. 3 In
Annis the plaintiffs sought a permanent injunction enjoining the
defendant bank and South Dakota state officials from coming on the
Cheyenne River Sioux Indian Reservation to enforce a judgment
obtained in a South Dakota state court against plaintiff. Plaintiff
successfully argued that, although the state court may have had
power to adjudicate the merits of the notes, it lacked power to
enforce, on the reservation, any judgment entered by the state court.
The crucial issue in the case was not whether the state court had the
power to adjudicate the initial cause of action, but whether the
attachment, to be successful, had to be performed on the reservation.
64. See Felix v. Patrick, 145 U.S. 317 (1892); Harrison v. Laveen, 67 Ariz. 337, 196 P.2d
456 (1948); Citizenship Act of 1924, Act of June 2, 1924, ch. 233, 43 Stat. 253.
65. United States v. Rickert, 188 U.S. 432 (1903).
66. McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax Comm'n, 411 U.S. 164 (1973).
67. Warren Trading Post Co. v. Arizona State Tax Comm'n, 380 U.S. 685 (1965).
68. See Snohomish County v. Seattle Disposal Co., 70 Wash.2d 668, 425 P.2d 22 (1967);
25 C.F.R. § 1.4 (1975).
69. See Snohomish County v. Seattle Disposal Co., 70 Wash.2d 668, 425 P.2d 22 (1967);
25 C.F.R. § 1.4 (1975Y.
70. See 25 U.S.C. § § 311-328 (1970).
71. See Vollman, Criminal Jurisdiction in Indian Country: Tibal Sovereignty and
Defendants' Rights in Conflict, 22 Univ. of Kan. L. Rev. 387 (1974); Canby, supra note 57,
and for a more theoretical discussion of civil jurisdiction, see Comment, The Indian Battle
for Self-Determination,58 Cal. L. Rev. 445 (1970).
72. 335 F. Supp. 133 (D.S.D. 1971).
73. 84 N.M. 629, 506 P.2d 786 (1973).
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7
The Federal District Court, citing Williams v. Lee " and Kennerly v.
7
District Court, 5 upheld plaintiff's claim of no state power. However, the court allowed defendant bank's counterclaim sought under
the theory of pendant jurisdiction. The court admitted that by
granting defendant's counterclaim it was preventing the defendant
bank from suffering an out-of-pocket loss and the plaintiff from
becoming unjustly enriched by being able to keep property for which
he had not paid. Significantly, the court noted that "The result of
granting plaintiff an injunction without granting defendant relief on
enrolled Indians living
his counterclaim would be to cut off credit to
7
within the closed portion of the reservation." 6
In State Securities, Inc. ' 7 the New Mexico Supreme Court held
that the New Mexico courts could obtain personal jurisdiction over
Navajo defendants by serving process on them while on the Navajo
Reservation when the dispute involved a contract entered into in
New Mexico. The court reasoned that to serve process on the reserva7
tion would not interfere with the Tribe's right of self-government. 1
The court based its reasoning on Organized Village of Kake v.
Egan,7" a Supreme Court case that said a state's disclaimer of right
and title to Indian lands was a disclaimer of proprietary rather than
governmental interest. The New Mexico Supreme Court found,
because the state's exercise of its power to serve process was not
derived from a proprietary interest, that this exercise of jurisdiction
did not infringe on the right of Indians to govern themselves. Justice
Montoya's dissent points out the paradoxical nature of the court's
holding:

[W] e are left in the anomolous position of allowing service of state
process upon an Indian within the reservation and obtaining a
judgment which, under the decided cases, cannot be enforced on the
reservation. 8 o
These two cases illustrate the need for some type of recognition
procedure. Although some loss of tribal autonomy is implicit in
institutionalizing the relationship between tribe and state, such tribal
autonomy is well worth sacrificing for the benefit of Indians living
on the reservation. Reservation Indians who shop in border towns,
especially when they purchase goods requiring credit, usually must
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.

358 U.S. 217 (1959).
400 U.S. 423 (1971).
335 F. Supp. at 138.
84 N.M. 629, 506 P.2d 786 (1973).
Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217 (1959).

79. 369 U.S. 60 (1962).

80. 84 N.M. at 636, 506 P.2d at 793.
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pay a premium if they are going to use the goods on the reservation,
simply because they are forced to subsidize the defaults that may
occur with others. If a workable system of enforcement of judgments
existed, perhaps sellers' losses would decrease by supplying a means
of enforcement for judgments procured against defaulting creditors.
As a result, the price of credit for Indians would dramatically decrease. The federal government, at little cost, could begin to solve
this problem by extending the operation of the Full Faith and Credit
Clause to tribe and state. Because such extension by means of the
present case law would necessarily create contradictory decisions, 8'
full faith and credit should be extended to Indian tribes through
congressional legislation.
THE PROBLEMS AND IMPLICATIONS OF EXTENDING
FULL FAITH AND CREDIT TO INDIAN TRIBES
Although extension of full faith and credit to Indian tribes is
attractive for its philosophical and practical aspects, the unique
status of Indian tribes suggests that such extension may be difficult
to develop into a workable system. The major problems will arise in
the area of recognition of judgments rather than in choice of law.
In the choice of law area, it is clear that there is no practical,
constitutional, or statutory requirement of applying foreign state
laws in the forum state court if the forum has the proper jurisdictional basis for hearing the case. In a series of workman's compensation cases, 8 2 the Supreme Court analyzed circumstances
requiring such application and concluded that full faith and credit
did not compel the application of a foreign state's laws. In Alaska
Packers Ass'n v. Industrial Accident Commission the Supreme Court
found that:
Prima Facie every state is entitled to enforce in its own courts its
own statutes, lawfully enacted. One who challenges that right,
because of the force given to a conflicting statute of another state by
the full faith and credit clause, assumes the burden of showing, upon
81. Of course, if a Supreme Court case unequivocally found that Indian tribes were
territories for purposes of 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (1970), then congressional action would be
unnecessary to avoid confusion. Because the present case law is unclear, different courts
could reach different conclusions as to the application of full faith and credit to Indian
tribes. See, e.g., Jim v. CIT Financial Services Corp., 87 N.M. 362, 553 P.2d 751 (1975),
(holding that the Navajo Reservation is a territory for purposes of 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (1970))
and Begay v. Miller, 70 Ariz. 380, 222 P.2d 624 (1950), (expressly indicating that a Navajo
divorce was not entitled to full faith and credit in Arizona).
82. See Bradford Elec. Light Co. v. Clapper, 286 U.S. 145 (1932); Alaska Packers Ass'n
v. Industrial Accident Comm'n, 294 U.S. 532 (1935); Pacific Employers Ins. Co. v. Industrial Accident Comm'n, 306 U.S. 493 (1939).
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some rational basis, that of the conflicting interest 8involved
those of
3
the foreign state are superior to those of the forum.
This holding, further refined in Pacific Employers Ins. Co. v.
Industrial Accident Commission84 and Carrol v. Lanza,"
has
effectively eliminated the need for a state to apply foreign state laws
under the command of the Full Faith and Credit Clause or 28 U.S.C.
§ 1738 (1970). Consequently, a statutory extension of full faith and
credit to Indian tribes would create no major problems in the choice
of law area.
Recognition of a foreign state judgment is another matter. The
opportunity for states to lawfully avoid recognizing a foreign state
judgment are extremely limited. To determine how tribal courts
might resist the enforcement of state judgments,8 6 it is necessaryto
look at the grounds that states currently employ for refusing recognition of certain state court judgments. Of the various grounds available for refusing recognition of foreign state judgments, the most
important here is the lack of jurisdiction of the rendering court.
In normal recognition of judgment situations between two states,
the issues raised are whether the first court had personal jurisdiction
over the parties8 7 or whether, in actions involving in rem or quasi in
rem jurisdiction, the court had jurisdiction over the res.8 8 Although
fewer cases raise the problem of subject matter jurisdiction, 9 it is
more important to Indian law and full faith and credit Subject matter
jurisdiction, used here in its broadest sense, encompasses such restrictions as the inability to hear local actions occurring outside the
court's geographical jurisdiction, actions that the state legislature has
restricted it from hearing, and actions prohibited by the United
States Constitution or by federal law. The various federal prohibitions on state courts are of particular importance to Indian law and
full faith and credit.
Federal Prohibitionsand the Problems of Subject Matter Jurisdiction
If a federal prohibition runs against a state court, then the resulting lack of subject matter jurisdiction could be raised in a tribal
83. 294 U.S. 532, 547-548 (1935).

84. 306 U.S. 493 (1939).
85. 349 U.S. 408 (1955).
86. Although it is not altogether clear that Indian tribes would resist enforcement of
foreign state judgments, the case of Annis v. Dewey County Bank, 335 F. Supp. 133 (D.S.D.
1971), illustrates how the situation might arise.
87. See Restatement (Second) of Conflicts § § 24-55, § 104 (Rev. 1971).

88. Id. at § § 56-68, § 104.
89. Id. at § 105.
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court if the holder of such a state court judgment attempted to
enforce it in a tribal court. In order to understand this potential
problem, a delineation of the federal prohibitions that run against
state courts in connection with Indian tribes is necessary.
The first important case in this area is Worcester v. Georgia.9 0 In
striking down Georgia statutes that restricted rights of the Cherokee
Nation, the Supreme Court, per Chief Justice Marshall, held that the
power of Congress over Indians was plenary-all powers not taken
away from the tribes by the United States still resided in the tribe. In
1959, the Supreme Court modified Worcester by redefining the
interests to be examined in a tribe/state controversy. In Williams v.
Lee, 9 1 a case involving a non-Indian seller's attempt to recover in
Arizona state court for goods sold to a Navajo on the reservation, the
Court formulated a new test for determining state power on an
Indian reservation:
[A] bsent governing Acts of Congress, the question has always been
whether the state action infringed on the Rights of reservation

Indians to make their own laws and be ruled by them.9 2

Thus, because of this federal prohibition against state interference
with tribal autonomy, the Arizona state court did not have subject
matter jurisdiction over the case. More recently, the Supreme Court,
in McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax Commission,9"

held that

Indians and Indian property on an Indian reservation are not subject
to state taxation except by express congressional authorization. The
Court found that since Arizona could not exercise either civil or
criminal jurisdiction over the tribe the State likewise lacked power to
tax the tribe, its lands, or its members living on the reservation.
When these three cases are read together, the status of state jurisdictions over Indian reservations for civil matters appears to be as
follows:
(1) A state may acquire general jurisdiction over a reservation
only as prescribed by Congress;
(2) Lacking general jurisdiction, a state has no power to adjudicate when the issue involves Indians engaged in reservation activity;
(3) If at least one party is not an Indian, the court must inquire if
the state jurisdiction asserted infringes on a tribe's right of selfgovernment, and if so, the tribe retains exclusive jurisdiction.
Given this jurisdictional quagmire, the defense of lack of juris90.
91.
92.
93.

31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832).
358 U.S. 217 (1958).
Id. at 220.
411 U.S. 164 (1973).
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diction to adjudicate actions against Indians in recognition of state
judgments becomes extremely important. A tribal court could refuse
to recognize a state court judgment on the grounds that the state
court lacked subject matter jurisdiction. Normally, the question of
subject matter jurisdiction is not so complicated in judgment recognition proceedings between states. But in the case of Indian tribes,
the Williams infringement test presents added conftision. Because the
Williams infringement test is susceptible to wide interpretation, a
tribal court could interpret the test in such a way as to avoid recognition of a state court judgment. If a state court judgment creditor
seeks to enforce a judgment on the reservation, then probably the
matter adjudicated was of some tribal interest. If the tribal interest
was sufficient, then the tribal court likely would find that the state
court action infringed the tribe's right of self-government. This conclusion would necessarily result in finding that the state court had no
subject matter jurisdiction, thus rendering the judgment unenforceable.
This confusion can be illustrated by four hypotheticals.
(1) Plaintiff is injured in State X by defendant's negligent act.
Defendant visits State Y on vacation. Plaintiff goes to State Y and
sues defendant in State Y court. State Y has proper jurisdiction since
the cause of action is transitory. Because the State Y court had
proper jurisdiction over the cause of action, plaintiff would have no
trouble having his judgment enforced in State X. Defendant would
not be able to argue that the State Y court lacked subject matter
jurisdiction.
(2) Plaintiff is injured on Reservation X by defendant's negligent
act. Both plaintiff and defendant are Indian residents of the reservation. Defendant takes a vaction to State Y which is off the reservation. Plaintiff serves defendant in State Y to appear in a State Y
court. State Y has no jurisdiction since the cause of action is one
between Indians occurring on a reservation. If State Y renders a
judgment and plaintiff attempts to enforce it on the reservation,
then defendant will be able to successfully attack the judgment on
the ground that State Y lacked subject matter jurisdiction.
(3) Plaintiff, a non-Indian living on Reservation X, is injured on
the reservation by the negligent act of defendant, an Indian. Defendant visits State Y on vacation. Plaintiff goes to State Y and sues
defendant in State Y court. State Y may or may not have subject
matter jurisdiction depending upon whether the adjudication of the
suit is an infringement of the tribe's right of self-government. If State
Y renders a judgment its enforceability on the reservation will be
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questionable. If the tribal court of the reservation is a hostile forum,
then it probably will not recognize the judgment.
(4) Plaintiff is injured on Reservation X by defendant's negligence. Both are non-Indians. Proper service is obtained on defendant
by plaintiff to appear in State Y court. State Y may or may not have
jurisdiction depending on the application of the Williams infringement test.9 4 The uncertainty of the application of the Williams test
creates corresponding uncertainty of enforceability of such a judgment in a tribal court.
These hypotheticals illustrate how enforcement of state court
judgments might be thwarted even if full faith and credit for Indian
tribes becomes a statutory reality. In many cases the holder of a state
court judgment who wishes to have that judgment enforced on a
reservation will encounter the defense of lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Additionally, the matter litigated resulting in the judgment
will probably have involved matters covered by the Williams infringement test. As a result, many state court judgments will not be
recognized by tribal courts, especially when the tribal court is the
forum deciding the presence or absence of subject matter jurisdiction
in the first action.
CollateralAttack of Tribal Court'sRefusal Through
Indian Civil Rights Act
In 1968 Congress passed the Indian Civil Rights Act, 9 s which
required Indian tribes to adhere to certain enumerated constitutional
restraints. The motive of the Act was to insure that no American
citizen would be denied certain fundamental liberties by any government within the United States. 9 6 The crucial part of the Act, at least
as it relates to a possible method of collaterally attacking the refusal
of a tribal court to recognize a state court judgment, is 25 U.S.C.
§ 1302 (1970), which states that:
No Indian tribe in exercising powers of self-government shall ... (8)
deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of its
laws or deprive any person of liberty or property without due
process of law ....
94. The Williams infringement test could possibly apply where the negligence action
involved negligence per se. If defendant's negligence involved a violation of a Reservation
statute, the tribe would arguably have an interest in having the action heard in tribal court.
Otherwise, the ability of the tribe to govern activities on the Reservation might be thwarted.
95. 25 U.S.C. § § 1301-1341 (1970).
96. Before the passage of the Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968 the Supreme Court had
found that neither the Bill of Rights nor the 14th Amendment applied to Indian tribes. See,
e.g., Talton v. Mayes, 163 U.S. 376 (1896).
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The use of this section of the Indian Civil Rights Act as a means of
collaterally attacking a tribe's refusal to enforce a judgment can best
be illustrated by the following hypothetical. Plaintiff, a non-Indian,
obtains a judgment against an Indian in a state court. The Indian has
been properly served; consequently, there is no question as to
personal jurisdiction. Also, the court is competent to hear the issues
presented, or at least it would be if the dispute were between two
non-Indians arising out of a transaction off the reservation. Plaintiff
then takes his judgment to a tribal court and requests recognition
and execution. The tribal court, because the issue in dispute under
the Williams infringement test interferes with the tribe's right of selfgovernment, refuses to accord the judgment full faith and credit on
the grounds that the state court did not have subject matter jurisdiction. Plaintiff now has nowhere to turn; he cannot appeal because
the tribe has no appellate court. And even if the tribe did have an
appellate court, there would be no appeal from the tribal court of
appeals to the outside. Plaintiff cannot challenge the tribe in federal
court because of the tribe's general sovereign immunity. 9 Unless
plaintiff can construct a civil rights argument based on a denial of
due process, he is without a remedy save for the possibility of
litigating the matter from the beginning in the tribal court. Therefore, the only way to challenge a tribe's refusal to enforce a state
court judgment would be through filing a suit in federal court under
the Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968, alleging that the tribe's failure to
recognize the judgment is a violation of due process. 9 8
Such a due process argument would be difficult to construct and
would be completely ineffective if a federal district court were to
refuse to hear such a suit against a tribe because of tribal sovereign
immunity. Generally, waivers of sovereign immunity must be by
Congress and must be express.' 9 The courts will not imply a waiver
from a jurisdictional statute' 0 0 and will not allow circumvention of

97. See notes 99-101.
98. The judgment creditor might argue two separate due process theories. First, the
denial of full faith and credit deprives him of the right to have his judgment enforced under
the Full Faith and Credit Clause. Second, the lack of an impartial tribunal in which to
enforce his judgment deprives him of his due process right to a fair and impartial hearing.
Unfortunately, there is little case law to support these theories. Only Jaster v. Currie, 198
U.S. 144 (1905), even remotely suggests that the Full Faith and Credit Clause confers a
substantive constitutional right. And the right to a fair and impartial hearing is usually
sustained only when there is blatant bias on the part of the judge. See, e.g., In re Murchison,
349 U.S. 133 (1955).
99. Thebo v. Choctaw Tribe, 66 F. 372 (8th Cir. 1895).
100. Id. and Adams v. Murphy, 165 F. 304 (8th Cir. 1908).
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the doctrine in suits brought against the United States as a trustee for
or guardian of the Indian." 0
More recent cases, however, have interpreted the Indian Civil
Rights Act as a waiver of tribal sovereign immunity.' 0 2 These recent
cases are important because they could remove tribal sovereign
immunity as a bar to suits challenging a tribal court's refusal to
recognize a state court judgment. A waiver of sovereign immunity
would be of no help, however, if the federal district judge hearing the
action challenging a tribal court's refusal to recognize a state court
judgment found that the right to have a foreign state judgment recognized under the Full Faith and Credit Clause was not a right protected by the Indian Civil Rights Act. If this were the judge's finding,
which it easily could be since the question has never been litigated,
then sovereign immunity would still be a bar to the suit. The possible
bar of sovereign immunity illustrates the need for creating a statutory procedure for enforcing state judgments on Indian reservations.
CONCLUSION
Even if Congress were to extend the operation of the Full Faith
and Credit Clause to Indian tribes through statutory enactments, as
the New Mexico Supreme Court did in Jim, substantial problems
would remain. In the recognition of judgment proceedings in a state
or territory the judgment creditor has access to appellate courts if
the court where he seeks enforcement refuses to enforce the foreign
state judgment. Consequently, a judgment creditor usually can have a
lower court's refusal reviewed by a neutral forum.
The lack of a neutral forum to review a tribal court's refusal to
recognize a state court judgment is the heart of the problem. One
possible means of making full faith and credit workable between
tribe and state would be to provide appellate jurisdiction in a federal
court for review of refusal to recognize the foreign state judgment.
Such a statute might be in the following language:
The federal district court shall have jurisdiction to review an Indian
tribe's refusal to recognize a judgment of a state, territory, or tribe if
that refusal is based upon a finding that the rendering court lacked
jurisdiction. Such review shall be limited solely to the question of
jurisdiction, and no inquiry into the merits shall be made. Upon a
finding that the rendering court had proper jurisdiction, the federal
court shall execute judgment.
101. Haile v. Saunooke, 246 F.2d 293 (4th Cir. 1957).
102. See Twin Cities Chippewa Tribal Council v. Minnesota Chippewa Tribe, 370 F.2d
529 (8th Cir. 1967); Spotted Eagle v. Blackfeet Tribe, 301 F. Supp. 85 (D. Mont. 1969);
Dodge v. Nakai, 298 F. Supp. 17 (D. Ariz. 1968).

152

NEWMEXICO LAWRE VIEW

[Vol. 7

Such legislation would provide a workable and reliable recognition of
judgment procedure. It would also benefit both tribes and states by
institutionalizing relationships between them.

